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This newsletter is dedicated to Kenneth R. Hammond (1/13/1917 – 4/28/ 
2015), the founder of the Brunswik Society. 
 
Kenneth R. Hammond at the Brunswik 
Society Meeting 2004. 
 Hammond was the first person to transfer 
Brunswik’s research to judgment and 
decision-making. He vigorously promoted 
this perspective, and organized several 
conferences gathering researchers with 
common interests, some in Boulder (see the 
photograph below), and one as a lunch at 
an APA meeting (1981, Los Angeles). He 
welcomed the founding of the Society for 
Judgment and Decision Making (1981), and 
encouraged the organizers to leave plenty of 
space in the schedule for people to discuss 
informally. He served as the second 
president of SJDM. In 1985 he organized 
the first meeting of the Brunswik Society, to 
allow more focus on the themes and 
methods of Brunswikian research.  
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 Hammond’s work has inspired many scholars to fruitfully apply Brunswikian 
ideas to judgment and decision-making in various fields (see Dhami’s contribution in 
this newsletter) and for contributions by his students (see the note by Adelman). 
Recently, the scientific community has recognized the value of Hammond’s concepts 
of correspondence and coherence. These have been discussed critically and 
developed further in the submissions from Polonioli and by Dhami. 
We see a Brunswik Society Newsletter as an insufficient way to honor Ken 
Hammond and his lifelong curiosity about judgment and decision-making. We would 
therefore like to encourage you to initiate Hammond-based research activities such 
as symposia at conferences or special issues in relevant journals. One journal – the 
Journal of Artificial Societies and Social Simulation – has already expressed interest 
in Brunswikian research (see the contribution by Thorngate). Hoffrage and Marewski 
have also recently published Hammond’s last article in a special issue at the Journal 
of Applied Research in Memory and Cognition. Please have a look at their article, as 
there is also a call for commentaries from Brunswikians. We encourage you to take 
the opportunity to make your opinion known to a wider audience. 
This year’s Brunswik Society Newsletter also covers other work within the 
Brunswik framework related to music and sound (Gingras and Ko and Steffens) or 
measurement topics (Nestler and Oppenheimer). 
We hope that the current newsletter additionally inspires further thoughts and 
research activities which could be reported in the next Brunswik Society Newsletter, 
in special issues or other outlets. To keep up with the Brunswik Society and the 
associated newsletter, please sign up for the Brunswik Society mailing list which you 
will find at www.brunswik.org. We look forward to hearing your thoughts and ideas 
using this list. 
 
Many thanks to all authors for their contributions! 
 
Sincerely, 
Esther Kaufmann, James A. Athanasou and Robert M. Hamm 
 
Thank you to Tom Stewart, the webmaster of the Brunswik Society, for 
providing web access to the Newsletter.  
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__________________________ 
 
Lessons-Learned Research 
 __________________________ 
 
 
Len Adelman 
George Mason University, 
USA 
 
Contact: ladelman@gmu.edu 
 
When I was a graduate student, Ken Hammond routinely told us that people 
often can’t learn from experience (or history). The task is too complex and multi-
causal in many environments. Many Brunswikians agree with Ken. Now, we have 
increasing empirical support from the “evidence-based” research thrust in 
management, medicine, law enforcement, and other domains showing the 
inadequacy of many expert practices. Moreover, people are often overconfident that 
they have learned the correct lessons when things go wrong. The question that my 
colleagues (Dr. Paul Lehner and Dr. Lynn Cooper) at the MITRE Corporation and I 
have been addressing is, “Do methods differ in reducing people’s overconfidence 
that they have learned the correct lesson when projects fail?” 
We investigated two methods for reducing overconfidence: (1) listing 
alternative causes (in addition to the stated “lesson-learned”) for a negative project 
outcome, and (2) describing a counterfactual project history; that is, asking what if the 
identified lesson actually had been implemented and resulted in either a positive or 
negative outcome. These methods were selected because they are used in lesson-
learned interviews, albeit in an ad hoc manner, and because empirical research has 
found them successful in reducing overconfidence. The participants were employees 
in a systems-engineering, research and development corporation. They applied the 
methods to actual projects that failed in a critical way.  
As hypothesized, asking people to think about alternative causes for the failure 
significantly reduced participants’ mean confidence in their “lesson learned.” In 
contrast, and contrary to our hypothesis, asking people to think of a counterfactual 
history that would have resulted in a positive outcome either had no effect or 
significantly increased participants’ confidence. We had thought that people would 
naturally think of how things could go wrong when they thought of how they could go 
right. We were wrong. The counterfactual history method only significantly reduced 
participants’ mean confidence in their lesson when they explicitly thought of how it 
could result in a negative outcome.  
What and how one asks about “lessons learned” can lead to significantly 
different assessments. But perhaps this would not have surprised Ken, given the 
nature of the task.  
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______________________________________________________________________ 
 
Reporting Evidence from the Analysis of Mental Operations in the Item 
Response Process – Looking for Brunswikian Symmetry 
 _______________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
Sebastian Brückner 
Johannes Gutenberg-University Mainz, Germany 
 
Contact: brueckner@uni-mainz.de 
 
For many years, the Standards for Educational and Psychological Testing 
(AERA, APA & NCME, 2014) have claimed that it is necessary to analyze students’ 
response processes in standardized educational assessment. When students 
respond to standardized achievement tasks, they use different kinds of mental 
operations (e.g., analogical or deductive reasoning, elaboration of knowledge). The 
main objective of this response process analysis (AERA et al., 2014) is to assess, 
describe, structure, and compare these mental operations to theoretical assumptions 
and to correlate them with input variables (e.g., students’ sociodemographic features) 
and output variables (e.g., item and test scores) that are usually examined in 
assessments. 
However, in various educational study domains, mental operations are only 
rarely defined in task performance models (Leighton, 2004) or cognitive diagnostic 
models (Rupp, Templin, & Henson, 2010) and also are rarely empirically examined 
(e.g., using the think aloud method); for various frequently discussed reasons for this 
lack of research, see e.g., Brückner & Kuhn, 2013; Leighton, 2004). Furthermore, it is 
often not clear how these mental operations should be connected with other kinds of 
validity evidences recommended by the Standards (e.g., evidence from expert 
interviews or evidence from test models like IRT Models). 
The work of Brunswik (1952, 1957) gives an indication regarding the role of 
mental operations in assessments and how other kinds of evidence can be linked to 
these operations according to the Standards. When he states that psychology is 
focused on “interrelationships between organism and environment”, it comes to mind 
that mental operations could be considered the result of an interrelation or interaction 
as well (e.g., Pellegrino, Baxter, & Glaser, 1999). In this context, students are the 
organisms and the items are the environment students have to cope with. The result 
of this interaction is the mental operations that lead to item responses (illustrated in 
the following figure).  
Since responding to an item can also be considered as making a decision, the 
symmetry (Wittmann, 1988; 2002) of the Brunswikian lens model offers a number of 
possibilities on how to analyze mental operations that should be equally affected by 
both student and item characteristics. For example, if a student knows about the 
economic concept of altruism and is expected to solve an item that requires knowing 
this concept, then the mental operation should not be distorted by item features (e.g., 
item difficulty, item format or ratings from experts), but should equally support the 
memorization of this concept.  
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Thus, when mental operations are analyzed, both perspectives should always 
be explored and the correlations should be compared. Brunswik’s metaphor (1957, p. 
5) that both the organism and the environment should be compared to “a married 
couple” with mental operations as their children can be expanded to illustrate that, in 
similar situations (e.g., when the child has broken a vase), both parents should 
ideally treat the child (the mental operations) in the same way (e.g., both parents 
might be angry in a similar way instead of one praising and the other reprimanding 
the child).  
Empirically this means that the symmetry must be analyzed using correlation 
or regression analyses (Wittmann, 2002). In an assessment, several criteria of the 
environment (items) and organisms (students) are included and therefore a nested 
structure of the data becomes evident that can be analyzed from both sides (e.g., if 
mental operations are nested within items or students) using generalized linear 
multilevel models (an empirical example is given in Brückner and Pellegrino, in 
review). 
The implication for current validation standards is that analyses of mental 
operations and item scores should not focus exclusively on student characteristics, 
but should also take into account item characteristics. In my current work (Brückner, 
in press; Brückner & Pellegrino, under review) I take into account the idea that mental 
operations are situation-specific – which is also reflected in the currently discussed 
socio-cognitive paradigm (Mislevy & Durán, 2014) – and that they must be analyzed 
reflecting the aspects of a symmetry (Wittmann, 1988; 2002). Thus, the comparison 
of the results from both models should increase the credibility of findings from mental 
operations when a symmetrical structure is found. The idea that mental operations 
are not only a deductive result from student thinking, but rather should be treated as 
an actively constructed process that arises from the interaction of student and item 
features is important for future validation studies.  
Finally, this work is included in my recently finished PhD-thesis (see Brückner, 
in press). Questions and recommendations are welcomed. 
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__________ 
 
Ken and I 
 __________ 
 
 
Madeep K. Dhami 
Middlesex University, London, UK 
 
Contact: m.dhami@mdx.ac.uk 
 
My first contact with Ken was over email in 1996, when I started my PhD. I had 
read his early work with great interest and was left wondering why it was so important 
to use an idiographic approach to understanding human behavior, given that most of 
psychology used a nomothetic approach. Ken soon made it clear why(!) and I 
proceeded to study legal decision-making at the individual-level for my PhD.  
I next met Ken in person in the 1997 Brunswik Meeting in Philadelphia. His 
vision for how human judgment and decision-making (JDM) should be studied was 
clear, his constructive critique of alternative (accepted) approaches in JDM was 
convincing, and his wide-ranging knowledge of the behavioral sciences (including the 
history of science) was impressive. He was a magnet for those of us who wanted to 
know more about the life and work of Egon Brunswik, and to learn about how 
Brunswikian ideas could be interpreted and applied.  
Over the past two or so decades, I had the pleasure of engaging with Ken on 
numerous occasions. Beyond the “advice” he offered with regard to planning each 
year’s Brunswik Society meetings, we spoke about our respective research. He 
provided feedback on my manuscripts and I on his. We often talked about 
collaborating on a project and once we did start a paper, only to soon realize that we 
did not agree on some of the fundamentals. I questioned his depiction of “quasi-
rationality” and naively asked him to differentiate it from a concept used by 
Kahneman and Frederick. Ken and I didn’t speak for a while after that “heated” 
exchange – although he continued to write wonderful letters of reference for me as I 
moved forward in my academic career.  
As a student of Brunswik, Ken had applied Brunswikian ideas to the study of 
clinical judgment (Hammond, 1955), multiple cue probability learning (Hammond & 
Summers, 1965), cognitive feedback (Todd & Hammond, 1965), interpersonal conflict 
(Hammond, 1965, 1973; Hammond, Todd, Wilkins, & Mitchell, 1966) and 
interpersonal learning (Hammond, 1972; Hammond, Wilkins, & Todd, 1966). Then, in 
1975, he synthesized this work and developed social judgment theory (Hammond, 
Stewart, Brehmer, & Steinmann, 1975). He had achieved so much so early, and yet 
he continued. Notably, Ken proposed cognitive continuum theory (Hammond, 1996, 
2000). 
Ken’s passionate, albeit sometimes despairing manner, served to enthuse me; 
making me feel like I could make a difference and that much work was yet to be 
done. Below, I provide the abstract for a paper I published this year on quasi-
rationality – I think Ken would have approved. I shall miss him. 
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Dhami, M. K., Belton, I., & Goodman-Delahunty, J. (2015). Quasi-rational 
models of sentencing. Journal of Applied Research on Memory and Cognition, 4, 
239-247. 
Abstract: Cognitive continuum theory points to the middle-ground between the 
intuitive and analytic modes of cognition, called quasirationality. In the context of 
sentencing, we discuss how legal models prescribe the use of different modes of 
cognition. These models aim to help judges perform the cognitive balancing act 
required between factors indicating a more or less severe penalty for an offender. We 
compare sentencing in three common law jurisdictions (i.e., Australia, the US, and 
England and Wales). Each places a different emphasis on the use of intuition and 
analysis; but all are quasirational. We conclude that the most appropriate mode of 
cognition will likely be that which corresponds best with properties of the sentencing 
task. Finally, we discuss the implications of this cognition-task correspondence 
approach for researchers and legal policy-makers. 
References:  
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York: Academic Press, Inc. 
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___________________________________________________________ 
 
Cue Redundancy in the Communication of Musical Emotions:  
The Case of Sound Intensity 
 ___________________________________________________________ 
 
 
Bruno Gingras 
University of Innsbruck,  
Austria 
 
Contact: brunogingras@gmail.com 
 
Music is generally recognized as a potent inducer of emotions in everyday life 
(Sloboda, 2010). Two theoretical models are frequently applied to the communication 
of musical emotions: the Brunswik lens model, first applied to music by Juslin (1995), 
and the cue-redundancy model (Balkwill & Thompson, 1999). Both models predict 
that musical emotions are encoded by a large number of partially redundant auditory 
cues that can be used flexibly. Based on these models, the emotional information 
encoded by one acoustical parameter may also be carried, at least in part, by other 
acoustical features. 
We sought to test two hypotheses that follow from the Brunswik lens and cue-
redundancy models by comparing the emotional ratings obtained on a large set of 
musical excerpts and on an identical set that was normalized for sound intensity 
(amplitude normalization). Intensity is a basic acoustical cue signaling emotional and 
motivational states in humans and animals. As such, sound intensity is recognized as 
one of the most reliable predictors of both speech- and music-induced arousal (Ilie & 
Thompson, 2006; Scherer, 1989). However, based on the Brunswik lens and cue-
redundancy models, we hypothesized that other acoustical features besides intensity 
could be effective predictors of music-induced arousal for both original and 
amplitude-normalized excerpts. Additionally, we predicted that the emotional ratings 
of amplitude-normalized excerpts should not differ significantly from those obtained 
on the original versions of these excerpts, because other acoustical cues, partly 
redundant with intensity, would convey the information carried by variations in 
intensity. The latter prediction was further supported by Juslin’s (2001) observation 
that acoustical parameters often covary in music performance. 
We adopted Russell’s (1980) circumplex model of affect, which situates 
emotions in a two-dimensional space defined by energy arousal and pleasantness 
(valence), and selected musical stimuli varying along these dimensions. Our stimuli 
consisted of eighty-four 6-second representative excerpts from Romantic (early to 
middle 19th-century) piano trios. We used only one excerpt per movement to avoid 
intra-opus familiarity effects, and we chose excerpts with uniform emotional 
expression. Mean root-mean-square energy equalization was used to obtain the 
amplitude-normalized excerpts. 
Sixty psychology students at the University of Vienna, with less than three 
years of musical training and not musically active at the time of the experiment, were 
invited to participate in our study. Thirty participants rated the original excerpts, 
whereas another 30 participants rated the amplitude-normalized excerpts. The two 
groups were balanced for gender and matched for age. Participants were asked to 
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rate each excerpt on a 7-point scale for familiarity (“very unfamiliar” to “very familiar”), 
felt arousal (“very calm” to “very aroused”), and felt pleasantness (“very unpleasant” 
to “very pleasant”). Excerpts were played on headphones at a comfortable fixed 
intensity level. The order of presentation of the excerpts was randomized, and there 
was a 5-second delay between successive excerpts. 
We conducted the sound analysis using Praat (Boersma & Weenink, 2009) 
and the MIR Toolbox in MATLAB (Lartillot, Toiviainen, & Eerola, 2008) and 
investigated acoustical features comprising four domains: dynamics, sound 
spectrum, rhythm, and tonality. In total, we computed the values of 21 features for 
each excerpt and then conducted regression analyses, using a stepwise-forward 
procedure, to predict the arousal and pleasantness ratings based on acoustical 
features (4 parameters with high collinearity were excluded from the analyses). 
Because familiarity is known to influence emotion ratings, we excluded 4 excerpts 
whose familiarity ratings were higher than 4 (the middle of the scale), leaving 80 
excerpts to be analyzed. 
Regarding our hypothesis that other acoustical features besides intensity 
should predict the variation in arousal ratings between excerpts, the regression 
analysis showed that two features related to the sound spectrum, spectral flux and 
spectral entropy, accounted for 65% of the variance in arousal ratings for both 
original and amplitude-normalized sets. Thus, although intensity was the most 
important predictor of arousal for the original set, arousal ratings were effectively 
predicted by spectral features in the absence of intensity cues. 
With respect to our hypothesis that emotional ratings should not differ 
significantly between both sets of excerpts, we found a high correlation between the 
original and amplitude-normalized sets for mean arousal ratings (rs = .84, p < .001), 
and a slightly lower one for pleasantness (rs = .69, p < .001). Furthermore, an 
analysis of the Procrustean fit between the two-dimensional emotion spaces 
associated with the original and amplitude-normalized sets yielded a high correlation 
of .80 (p < .001). To summarize, arousal and pleasantness ratings were highly 
correlated between both sets and the emotion spaces for both sets were similar, 
thereby corroborating our second hypothesis. 
Overall, our results indicate that musical emotions are conveyed by several 
acoustical cues that may be partially overlapping. These findings, which are 
consistent with both the cue-redundancy and Brunswik lens models, suggest that 
music is a robust communication system which uses redundancy to augment its 
versatility and efficacy.  
References:  
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Consumer judgment of the nutritional value of food products is increasingly 
pertinent as obesity and nutritionally-related illnesses remain at record levels in 
developed nations. The U.S. 1990 Nutritional Labeling and Education Act 
standardized a nutrition label (the Nutrition Facts Panel, or NFP) with the goal of 
helping consumers to make better judgments. However, the degree to which 
consumers use the NFP to judge the nutritional quality of foods and make efficient 
choices is not well understood. We have started a line of research on nutrition 
judgments of packaged foods that uses the Lens Model as a framework. First, our 
recent study (Gonzalez-Vallejo & Lavins, 2015) demonstrated that US consumers’ 
judgments of nutrition of cereals based on NFP information was in ordinal agreement 
with a nutrition profile scoring system NuVal®. NuVal is a nutrition expert algorithm 
that rates foods in a scale of 1 to 100 with the top score being the best in nutritional 
value. We used NuVal as the gold standard to assess nutrition accuracy and to study 
the patterns of cue usage (nutrients) by participants in relationship to the usage by 
the NuVal system. Our study also investigated whether higher accuracy would be 
reached with new proposed FDA labels and found that the current label was as good 
as or better than the proposals. Two hundred and thirteen adults completed an online 
survey (66.2% female, mean age 37.31, SD 12.56 years). Judged nutrition quality of 
cereals was positively correlated with protein, fiber, and potassium and negatively 
correlated with sugars and sodium. This pattern appeared when using the current 
NFP or the modified versions. Highlighted nutrients in modified NFP formats did not 
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affect their perceived importance as intended by FDA. Accuracy of the nutrition 
quality judgments was highest under the current NFP (Spearman’s ρ = .76 for the 
current NFP; .64 and .72 for the other formats). Regression analysis showed that 
nutrition judgment accuracy increased significantly (adjusted R2 = .13) with obesity 
knowledge (β = .27), age (β = .15) and current NFP (β = .13).  
Another study examined judgments of 196 individuals (MTurk and a student 
sample) living in the United States (mean age 28, SD = 12 years) who rated the 
nutritional quality of cereals or snacks. NuVal related differently to nutrients in cereals 
and snacks with fiber emphasized in both. Negative beta weights were associated 
with sugar and sodium in cereals. In snacks, there was a negative association with 
saturated fat and a positive one with other carbohydrates. Judgment consistency was 
higher when judging cereals (median R2 = .6) than snacks (median R2 = .5). 
Accuracy showed the reversed pattern with higher achievement index for snacks 
(median ra = .3) than for cereals (ra = .2). Higher agreement of the judgment policies 
between person and environment was obtained with cereals (median G = .5 for 
cereals, and G = .4, for snacks). No individual level variables related to either 
consistency or accuracy of the judgments. Current studies continue to explore 
individual differences that may relate to nutrition judgments and also food choices. 
The role of front-of-package labels (FOPs) is also under investigation as well as 
models of attention and choice.  
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In September 2015, the Journal of Applied Research in Memory and Cognition 
(JARMAC) published a special issue on “Modeling and Aiding Intuition in 
Organizational Decision Making”, edited by Julian Marewski and Ulrich Hoffrage 
(2015a). The issue contained 17 articles – all are open access and can be 
downloaded at http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/journal/22113681/4/3. For an 
overview and the call for commentaries (deadline for proposals: January 10th, 2016), 
see the entry of Marewski and Hoffrage (2015b) in this newsletter.  
In the present entry, we will give an overview of our introduction to this special 
issue. We will focus on those parts (and on the discussion of those papers in the 
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special issue) that are related to Brunswikian approaches. There are three such links 
to the work of Egon Brunswik: (1) the conceptualization of intuition as inference, (2) 
the notion of quasirationality, and (3) the methodological imperative of using a 
representative design when studying intuition where it can be been built, namely in 
natural environments. In the following, we will heavily cite from this introduction 
(Hoffrage & Marewski, 2015), albeit without using quotation marks. 
Our introduction is, in a way, quite special for a scientific publication. 
Specifically, we did not shy away from reproducing artworks, from weaving 
metaphors into the text, and from using a style that is quite unusual for a scientific 
journal – both personalizing and anthropomorphizing the notion of intuition, replacing 
the “it” with “she” and turning an “object of inquiry” into a “subject” whom we refer to 
as the Lady in Black.  
Our introductory article is divided into 3 major sections (followed by epilogue, 
acknowledgment, and references). In the first section, entitled “Intuitive and historical 
accounts of intuition” we look at (1.1) spontaneous answers to the question “What is 
intuition?” One candidate is that it is a sixth sense, some kind of extrasensory 
perception, an inner voice through which some supernatural beings – Gods, Angels – 
speak to us. Another one conceives intuition as some sort of animalistic instinct, and 
hence also allows animals to have intuitions – maybe even better ones than humans. 
Staying within the animalistic sphere, but allowing this sphere to enter the human 
kingdom, one could also conceptualize intuition as an evolutionary remnant of our 
reptilian brains, an old but fast track on the neuronal highway (or, maybe closely 
related, to locate it in the Freudian unconscious). Note that these two 
conceptualizations – intuition as an inspiration, an inner voice, possibly of divine 
origin or as an animalistic instinct – correspond to models of man and to ideas about 
our origin: the fallen angel versus the dressed ape, respectively. A third view is that 
these two conceptions might be just projections, reflecting that there is something we 
do not know and cannot clearly see. The conclusion of such a skeptical position 
might be that intuition is, at the end of the day, nothing more than a catch-all category 
for everything related to cognition that we cannot explain. Bluntly speaking, a label 
for the black-box – and the home of our Lady in Black. Following this third option, we 
build on the metaphors of light and darkness and place intuition in the middle, that is, 
in the twilight, where analytical thinking meets what is coming from our 
unconsciousness. We introduce the two poles of this spectrum as two eras in history: 
(1.2) The Enlightenment (promoting rational thinking and analysis) and (1.3) 
Romanticism (stressing the mystery, emotions, and subjective experiences). 
Our second section, entitled “Analysis versus intuition today” is divided into 
five subsections. We (2.1) discuss the culture of objectivity and the fight against 
subjectivity with its focus on analysis, objectivity, and quantification. And we point out 
that (2.2) the rational and analytic approach, pushed forward during the 
Enlightenment, is often combined with an engineering approach. The idea is that 
understanding something amounts to being able to construct models of it, which may 
eventually be implemented in mechanical or electronic devices. This is objectivity and 
transparency in its purest form and it leads to a thought provoking question: Is it 
possible to build a machine (or to design software or an expert system) that has 
intuition? To the extent that intuitions are inferences, the answer must be yes, but 
what if we conceptualize intuitions as qualia, that is, as subjective experiences – then 
the answer is no. We continue by (2.3) contrasting Taylorism in the organization of 
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science with holistic worldviews and discuss how these two approaches relate to 
intuition. Subsequently, we (2.4) contrast System 1 and System 2 with respect to our 
question “What is intuition?” If intuitions are understood as instincts or as inferences, 
we may locate them in system 1. If they are, in the tradition of Gestalt psychology, 
understood as insights, we argue that they should better be located in system 2. If 
they are understood as (Divine) inspirations or messengers from that reality the 
Romanticists were referring to, they would not find a home in the System 1 / System 
2 landscape. We conclude this discussion by saying that our dear Lady in Black is 
with us everywhere and that she may not care how we categorize and label the 
places where she will whisper to us. In the last subsection (2.5), entitled 
“dichotomies, definitions, and dialectics”, we ask how analysis and intuition are 
related to each other. Are these dichotomies opposing each other? Or are they, like 
yin-yang, intertwined and complementing each other? Or like poles with the potential 
that something new can emerge in the middle, like virtues between vices (in 
Aristotle’s Nicomachean ethics)? Or like light and darkness that, together, have the 
potential to let colors emerge in the twilight (in Goethe’s theory of color that we 
contrast to the Newtonian approach)? Note that the dialectics between yin and yang 
and how they interact and influence each other is also reflected in theoretical 
approaches in psychology – for instance, in Brunswik’s (1952) notion of 
quasirationality, which has been further developed in Hammond’s (1996, 2000, 2010) 
Cognitive Continuum Theory (see also Dhami & Thomson, 2012). The notion of 
quasirationality points at a combination of analysis and intuition. It is the mode of 
cognition in the middle-ground between the two extreme poles. Simon (1987) 
expressed this idea as follows: “intuition is not a process that operates independently 
of analysis; rather, the two processes are essential complementary components of 
effective decision-making systems” (p. 61). 
In our third section, entitled “Pictures at an exhibition” we give a guided tour 
through the articles that we have collected for our exhibition. Here we only give a 
very brief summary of those papers that are the most closely related to Egon 
Brunswik. The first subsection (3.1), entitled “Experience, expertise, and 
environments” contains three articles, all single-authored by distinguished 
researchers: Gary Klein, James Shanteau, and Kenneth Hammond. These authors 
leaned back, so to speak, and wrote opinion pieces in which they adopted a wide 
perspective and reflected upon decades of their own but also others’ thinking, 
theorizing, and ways to conduct research. As another commonality, their articles 
focus on experience, expertise, and on the natural environment in which experience 
can be gathered and expertise can develop. The first variation of this theme we look 
at has been composed by Gary Klein: Intuition results from experience. Experience, 
in turn, produces experts. Given repeated exposure to various situations, these 
experts learned about the statistical structure of the environment, that is, they learned 
which cues are important and which ones are less so when assessing a situation and 
when predicting outcomes. The experts learned how these cues inter-correlate, and 
they learned to distinguish certain configurations of cues – patterns that are 
meaningful to experts but that novices may not recognize as such. This 
conceptualization also informed the name of Klein’s account: the recognition-primed 
decision model. Finally, and most importantly, these experts also learned what the 
best course of action is for which pattern. Accordingly, Klein defines “intuition as the 
way we translate our experience into action”. In his article, Klein (2015) describes the 
naturalistic decision making approach to intuition and contrasts it with two other 
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frameworks, namely the fast-and-frugal heuristics and the heuristics-and-biases 
research program. In his article, Klein offers seven suggestions for theory 
construction and research practice resulting from his synopsis of these three different 
approaches. 
Based on his rich experience from studying experts, James Shanteau (2015) 
focuses on a puzzle that is related to the experience of these experts. If experts in 
the same field share similar experiences and if intuition is based on experience, then 
these experts should develop similar intuitions and they should generally find 
themselves in agreement with each other. Shanteau provides a brief overview of the 
literature that speaks to this question and concludes that this is, indeed, often the 
case – but that there are also many studies that report the opposite. He discusses 
this heterogeneous pattern and explains the variation in terms of differences between 
the domains in which the experts gathered their experiences and developed their 
intuitions. Whether intuitions are good and whether experts develop the same 
intuitions depends not only on the experts themselves, but – to a larger extent – on 
the environment for which they gained their expertise. 
Another author who stresses the importance of the environment is Ken 
Hammond (2015), who advocates the methodological imperative that cognitive 
processes (including intuition) should be studied using a representative design. The 
notion of representative design has been developed by Egon Brunswik as an 
alternative to systematic design. The latter usually selects, often manipulates – and 
sometimes even artificially creates – stimuli in order to disentangle the causal 
influence of several factors that could impact the response of interest. This is what 
most of us do! Brunswik argued that the set of stimuli used in a study with a 
systematic design is most often not representative of the set of stimuli in the natural 
environment – to which people's cognition has adapted. His alternative, 
representative design, can be implemented by sampling stimuli representatively of 
the environment, for instance, by randomly sampling (for an overview of 
representative design, see Dhami, Hertwig, & Hoffrage, 2004). Brunswik’s work 
suggests that the Lady is, well, easy to deceive. If we gain experience in a natural 
environment but are subsequently brought into an environment which is not 
representative of our natural environment, the Lady may still speak to us – but we 
might be better off not to listen since the inference mechanisms that have developed 
in a representative environment might lead us astray in a study that used a 
systematic design. 
In his article for this special issue, Hammond adopts a historical perspective 
and reflects on the origins and receptions of representative design. It is hard to 
imagine a better author for this topic. Hammond was the last living student of 
Brunswik and in his essay he takes us back to the very beginning of his career – 
back to the 1940s at the University of California, Berkeley – but then covers six 
decades of debate centering upon the concept of representative design, thereby 
discussing the work of Gerd Gigerenzer, Daniel Kahneman, Phil Tetlock, and others. 
Unfortunately, we had to start the previous sentence with “Hammond was”. On April 
28, 2015, he passed away at a “biblical” age of 98 after a career spanning seven 
decades of theoretical and empirical contributions to the field of judgment and 
decision research. The present paper is for sure one among the last (if not the last) 
he has written. We feel extremely glad and honored that we can include it in this 
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special issue, and we believe he would be delighted as well if he could see the 
context (i.e., the other papers) in which his essay appears. 
The last of the 17 articles of the special issue that we want to highlight in the 
present overview with its focus on links to the work of Egon Brunswik is co-authored 
by Dhami, Belton, and Goodman-Delahunty (2015). It focusses on the middle-ground 
between intuition and analysis, in general, and on the role of quasirationality (as they 
call this middle-ground; see above) in sentencing decisions in the context of court 
trials, specifically. How should a particular case or person, ideally, be evaluated: by 
stepping back, abstracting from details, and applying legal rules in an objective 
manner, or by getting closer, seeing the specifics and using personal, eventually, 
intuitive judgment? Mandeep Dhami et al. (2015) look at both the legal system and at 
the actors in this system: They review how sentencing in common law jurisdictions in 
Australia, in the US, and in England and Wales is regulated and prescribed. As it 
turns out, none of these legal systems resembles one of our extremes; they all strike 
the balance between analysis and intuition, albeit with some variation and different 
tendencies towards the one or the other extreme. Moreover, the authors also study 
how decision makers – judges, jurors – actually function and decide in these legal 
environments, thereby addressing the question whether or not there is a place for our 
Lady in Black in a legal environment. 
In closing, we want to express our gratitude to all the authors who contributed 
to this special issue. We hope this collection of papers, with its numerous links to the 
work of Egon Brunswik, will receive the attention of many readers and will stimulate 
thinking about and discussion of this unknown and elusive, but surprisingly familiar 
Lady in Black.  
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In the course of our daily lives and work, we selectively attend to available 
information (environmental cues) and we render judgments about the state of the 
world. We also carry out - sometimes immodestly - self-appraisals, evaluating how 
skillful or capable we are in different contexts. Both of these perceptions, of the world 
around us and of our own efficacy and ability, can have important implications 
concerning our decision-making and consequent behaviors. From a safety 
perspective, it is critical to understand situations where perceptions or subjective 
appraisals deviate from objective reality (i.e., gaps). One can readily imagine a 
fatigued driver electing to drive onwards, because he fails to adequately recognize 
the signs of fatigue or over-estimates his ability to persevere. The gaps in subjective 
and objective measures have been related to calibration - a concept that has been 
broadly studied in many disciplines (e.g., Zell & Krizan, 2014).  
In a recent paper, we proposed a conceptual framework for understanding and 
studying calibration in the context of road safety (Horrey et al., 2015). While a 
complete accounting of the model is well beyond the scope of this article, we 
highlight a few of the relevant features in the hopes that interested readers will be 
encouraged to read the complete account. The model expands and elaborates on 
earlier models of demand regulation in driving (e.g., Fuller, 2005) as well as attention-
based models of information processing (e.g., Wickens & Hollands, 2000). Models of 
demand regulation have been useful in articulating the regulatory process in which 
the driver balances the momentary assessment of ability and the assessment of 
demand. Further, modeling the role of attention in supporting various stages of 
information processing affords a mechanism for elaborating how attention allocation 
policies support information selection and processing. Because we can only process 
so much information at any given point, the proposed framework incorporates a 
mechanism through which different information cues are selectively attended and 
weighed in rendering appraisals or judgments. Thus, the lens model is a critical 
component of the framework in respect to information selection and utilization (e.g., 
Brunswik, 1955; Hammond, 1955). In our model, two lens models are used to 
conceptualize: (a) how observers utilize information cues in the local environment to 
understand the current situation and (b) how observers selectively attend to 
information cues about their own ability and skills.  
In Horrey et al. (2015), we further describe the conceptual model in the context 
of three example areas in road safety: (a) our understanding of driver distraction, (b) 
the potential role and influence of in-vehicle automation and autonomous vehicles, 
and (c) the training of inexperienced drivers. In each of these areas, examining the 
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gaps between drivers’ understanding of self (and additionally in the case of 
automation, of system) and the actual situation as it is presented can carry some 
important ramifications for safety and efficiency. In elucidating the interplay between 
models of attention, demand regulation, and lens modeling of information selection 
and utilization, we hope that the conceptual framework will be useful in guiding 
research efforts concerning the role of calibration in driving as well as in many other 
domains.  
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Inferring the emotional state of a communication partner is an important 
aspect in order to achieve functional social interactions. The classical lens model 
equations (LME) allow for assessing the voice characteristics or cues that are utilized 
to attribute a certain emotional state to a sender. In addition, the ecological cue 
validity, as well as the achievement of the observer, i.e., the ability to infer the correct 
state from the cues, are determinable.  
In a recent publication (Bänziger et al., 2015), we extended this perspective by 
applying the tripartite emotion expression model (TEEP, see Scherer, 2013) to the 
domain of vocal emotion communication using the statistical technique of path 
analysis. The assumptions of the TEEP model are that a sender’s state is expressed 
by a number of objectively measureable distal cues. In the domain of vocal 
communication, these cues are represented by the acoustic characteristics that can 
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be extracted from the vocal signal via acoustic analysis. The listener perceives these 
distal cues as proximal percepts that can be assessed by using the Geneva Voice 
Perception Scale (GVPS, Bänziger et al., 2014). In the last stage of the model, 
proximal percepts are utilized to form a subjective judgment of the sender’s emotional 
state.  
One important feature of the TEEP model is that it allows for studying different 
stages of the vocal communication process simultaneously. Analyzing the 
relationship between a sender’s state and the distal acoustic measures allows for 
studying the means that are used by the sender to express a certain emotion 
(expression). The relationship between the acoustic measures and the proximal 
percepts reflect the mapping of the objectively measurable voice characteristics to 
the perceived voice characteristics (transmission) and finally the cue utilization is 
represented by the relationship between the proximal percepts and the perceived 
emotion (impression).  
In a series of studies that have been recently published (Bänziger et al., 2015), 
emotion portrayals were selected from two corpora generated in Munich and Geneva 
(see Bänziger et al., 2010). Anger, sadness, fear, happiness and arousal were target 
emotions. Eight acoustic parameters (distal cues), as well as their subjectively judged 
counterparts (proximal percepts) and ratings of the emotional content of the 
portrayals (perceived emotion) were included in the analyses.  
The TEEP analysis resulted in four path diagrams that allow for an 
assessment of the emotion communication process from the expressed emotions via 
the distal cues and proximal percepts to the perceived emotion. In addition it was 
possible to determine the amount of mediation from the expressed emotion to the 
perceived emotion through the different stages of the model.  
The highest amount of mediation through the TEEP model’s stages occurred 
for arousal, followed by anger, fear and sadness. The fact that not all of the correct 
inferences were mediated through the model’s stages suggests that not all of 
information that was used to correctly infer an emotional state was captured in the 
acoustic measures and proximal percepts. This leads to the conclusion that 
additional and more sophisticated measures that capture the acoustic information in 
the signal in the objective and subjective stages of the model are needed to map the 
inference process comprehensively.  
We also performed hierarchical regression analyses to assess the amount of 
variance gained in the perceived emotions, once the proximal percepts have been 
entered into the regression equations. The results indicate that once the perceived 
emotions had been accounted for by the subjectively judged voice characteristics, 
the acoustic measures do not provide much additional information with regard to the 
subjectively judged emotions.  
Comparing the TEEP analysis with the traditional LME approach, we find that 
the TEEP model provides a more integrative view of the communication process. It is 
to be expected that in future the pairing of advanced statistical techniques, such as 
multilevel latent variable modeling with probabilistic functionalism results in new 
approaches to the study of human perception and performance.  
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Bringing Ecology into the Usability Lab  
Using the ECOVAL Framework 
_______________________________________ 
 
 
Suzanne Kieffer 
 Université catholique de Louvain, Belgium 
 
Jean Vanderdonckt 
Université catholique de Louvain, Belgium 
 
Contact: suzanne.kieffer@uclouvain.be 
 
This contribution for the Brunswik Society Newsletter 2015 builds on Kieffer et 
al. (2015), a paper initially intended for a Human-Computer Interaction (HCI) 
audience which presents ECOVAL, a framework for supporting ecological 
approaches in usability testing. 
Usability is defined as “the extent to which a product can be used by specified 
users to achieve specified goals with effectiveness, efficiency, and satisfaction in a 
specified context of use” (ISO 9241-11, 1998). The context of use refers to four 
components: the user of the product, the task being performed by users, the tool 
being used to perform the tasks, and the environment in which such interaction takes 
place (Shackel, 1991). Whereas usability studies task-based interactions and 
focusses on the ability of users to achieve their goals efficiently and intuitively, the 
User Experience (UX) rather focusses on how users feel when they interact with a 
product. Formally, UX is defined as “a person's perceptions and responses that result 
from the use or anticipated use of a product, system or service" (ISO 9241-21, 2009). 
Usability testing is a usability evaluation method in which experimental 
participants execute some tasks with a computer system representation in order to 
achieve some goals. It aims at measuring the usability of a product by collecting 
usability metrics such as task success, time on task, errors, etc. Thereafter, the UX 
can be measured by combining usability metrics and UX metrics such as heart rate 
variance, stress, self-reported emotion, etc. Usability testing is really a key milestone 
towards successful UX, as it structures and optimizes the design, prototyping and 
evaluation processes involved in the product development lifecycle by giving insight 
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into the findings and providing reliable information to the decision makers (Tullis & 
Albert, 2013). 
The primary motivation for developing ECOVAL lies in the need for 
representative design in usability testing, i.e., the need for representing important 
aspects of the ecology toward which generalizations are intended (Dhami et al., 
2004; Hammond, 1998). While the focus of Kieffer et al. (2015) was the 
representativeness of stimuli used in usability testing, we present the ECOVAL 
framework here (Figure 1) as an adaptation of Brunswik’s lens model (Brunswik, 
1956). The expression of the product in the usability testing situation (Figure 1, 
central grey area) is broken down into six actual traits (distal cues) which correspond 
to six perceived traits (proximal cues). Perceived traits are exploited by users to infer 
the product’s state, develop a mental model for how it is supposed to work, and 
elaborate and apply a response to use it. User’s motor and emotional responses with 
the tested product reflect the usability of the product when employed in its intended 
context of use. Ecological validity in ECOVAL refers to the correlation between the 
perceived traits and the usability of the product in its intended context of use. 
 
 
Figure 1. The ECOVAL framework as an adaptation of Brunswik’s lens model. 
 
 
 
An example of the utilization of ECOVAL is provided in the Figure 2. In this 
case study, the mission of the usability team was to computerize paper-based 
procedures for the inspection of a production line in a factory. A usability test was 
conducted early in the design phase so as to detect and fix usability problems, and 
produce the next version of the prototype. 
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             Figure 2. Example of use of ECOVAL in an industrial case study. 
 
 
ECOVAL is, we believe, a significant contribution for the HCI community. 
Firstly, it clarifies the concept of ecological validity. In Brunswikian discourse, 
“ecological validity” refers to the correlation between a cue and the ecological 
criterion, and thus it is used to compare the quality of different cues and to 
understand why judgment based on such cues must have limited accuracy. In the 
HCI community, however, the term ecological validity refers to representativeness. In 
fact, it has been used by the HCI community with different meanings, making it a very 
confusing concept. It tacitly can refer to fieldwork (Carter et al., 2008), real-life or 
naturalistic conditions where experimental tasks are performed with high levels of 
fidelity (Castro et al., 2011), or studies “where subjects are totally unaware of being 
tested, testing is performed during their natural activity on the web” (Guerini et al., 
2012). Secondly, it provides usability and UX professionals with an operational 
framework to achieve representative design in usability testing. Finally, an industrial 
case study (Kieffer et al., 2015) demonstrated the relevance of conducting usability 
testing with representative design early in the development lifecycle. Specifically, this 
enabled the early detection of usability problems that would have remained 
overlooked otherwise, and therefore increased both user and organizational 
efficiencies. In particular, operating low-fidelity prototypes (clickable mock-ups) on the 
very device the system was intended to run on enabled the detection of usability 
problems that remained overlooked with paper-based prototypes. This also 
highlighted the influence of the test medium chosen to conduct usability on the user 
experience, user responses and user behavior. 
The representativeness of study designs, and of stimuli and their 
intercorrelations, and the ecological validity of perceived traits, need to be further 
investigated in order to complete the ECOVAL framework with guidelines for 
adequately achieving representative design according to the phase in the product 
development lifecycle.  
   
  
26  (BACK: Table of Contents) 
References:  
Brunswik, E. (1956). Perception and the representative design of psychological experiments. (2nd 
edition). Berkeley: University of California Press. 
Carter, S., Mankoff, J. Klemmer, S. R., & Matthews T. (2008). Exiting the cleanroom: On ecological 
validity and ubiquitous computing. Human-Computer Interaction, 23(1), 47-99. 
Castro, L. A., Favela, J., & Garcia-Pena, C. (2011). Naturalistic enactment to stimulate user 
experience for the evaluation of a mobile elderly care application. MobileHCI 2011, Stockholm, 
Aug. 30 - Sep. 2, 2011. 
Dhami, M. K., Hertwig, R., & Hoffrage, U. (2004). The role of representative design in an ecological 
approach to cognition. Psychological Bulletin, 130(6), 959-988. 
Guerini, M., Strapparava, C., & Stock, O. (2012). Ecological evaluation of persuasive messages using 
Google AdWords. Proceedings of the 50th Annual Meeting of the Association for Computational 
Linguistics, pp. 988–996. Jeju, Republic of Korea, July 8–14, 2012. 
Hammond, K. R. (1998). Representative design. The Brunswik Society. Web Essay. Retrieved 
November 11, 2015 from <http://www.brunswik.org/notes/essay3.html> 
ISO 9241-11. (1998). Ergonomic requirements for office work with visual display terminals (VDTs) – 
Part 11: Guidance on usability. 
ISO 9241-21. (2009). Ergonomics of human system interaction - Part 210: Human-centered design for 
interactive systems (formerly known as 13407). ISO F±DIS 9241-210:2009. 
Kieffer, S., Sangiorgi, U. B., & Vanderdonckt, J. (2015). ECOVAL: A framework for increasing the 
ecological validity in usability testing. In Proc. IEEE HICSS-48, Hawaii International Conference 
on System Sciences 2015, Kauai (HI), January 5-8 2015. 
Shackel, B. (1991). Usability - Context, framework, definition, design and evaluation. In B. Shackel, & 
S. J., Richardson (Eds.), Human factors for informatics usability (pp. 21–37), Cambridge 
University Press. 
Tullis, T. & Albert, W. (2013). Measuring the user experience: Collecting, analyzing, and presenting 
usability metrics. (2nd edition). Morgan Kaufmann Publishers Inc. San Francisco, CA, USA. 
 
________________________________________________________ 
 
The Sound of Power:  
Conveying and Detecting Hierarchical Rank through Voice 
________________________________________________________ 
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This article is based on recent research (Ko, Sadler, & Galinsky, 2015) where 
we used Brunswik’s Lens Model as a framework to investigate how hierarchical rank 
is manifest through speakers’ paralinguistic cues and whether listeners’ use those 
cues to make accurate inferences of the speakers.  
Cue-based person perception research has tended to focus predominantly on 
the perceiver with little or no consideration of the target person from where the cues 
originate. This imparts the erroneous impression that cues are invariant across 
situations and between targets. The advantage of utilizing Brunswik’s Lens Model is 
that it does not allow for such a one-sided consideration.  
Left side of the lens: Hierarchy-based vocal cues communicated by speakers 
For the left side of the lens, which represents how vocal cues of hierarchy are 
communicated, we recorded 161 young adult speakers (80 males) fluent in English. 
When speakers first came into the laboratory, we first recorded their baseline voice. 
Following this, the speakers were randomly assigned to role-play one of several roles 
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that were either high-rank or low-rank. Speakers were recorded a second time 
reading a standard passage while in their respective roles.  
For each speaker, we calculated six acoustical properties; once for the 
baseline voice and a second time for the hierarchical role voice. This allowed us to 
distinguish the impact of situational hierarchy from baseline dominance via controlling 
for the baseline acoustics in all of our analyses. 
The measured acoustics were the mean pitch, variability in pitch, mean 
resonance, variability in resonance, mean loudness, and variability in loudness. Over 
and above baseline levels and speaker sex, we found that speakers’ voices in the 
high-rank roles had higher pitch, more variability in loudness, and were more 
monotone (i.e., less variable in pitch), compared to low-rank roles.  
Right side of the lens: Hierarchy-based vocal cues utilized by perceivers 
In order to examine whether perceivers are able to make accurate inferences 
about speakers based on the acoustic cues, we had 40 perceivers listen to the 
speakers’ role recordings and make hierarchy-based inferences about the speakers. 
There were two measures of hierarchy-based inferences. One was more subjective 
in that the items focused on behaviors that are likely to be distinct between those in 
high versus low rank (e.g., How likely is it that this person is in a position to reward 
others?). The other was a more objective dichotomous identification of speakers’ 
rank level (i.e., high or low). We also investigated the specific acoustic cues that 
formed the basis of these inferences. 
The results showed that perceivers were able to make accurate behavioral 
judgments based solely on vocal cues. Specifically, over and above speaker sex, 
speakers’ who had been in the high-rank condition were rated as more likely to 
engage in high- than low-rank behaviors whereas speakers who had been in the low-
rank condition were rated as more likely to engage in low- than high-rank behaviors. 
Perceivers were also significantly more accurate than chance in identifying speakers’ 
rank level. Perceivers used increases in pitch, loudness, and loudness variability to 
make accurate inferences about speakers’ assigned roles. 
Achievement: Bringing the left and right sides of the lens together 
To complete Brunswik’s Lens Model, we examined overall achievement. In 
particular, we assessed the mediating role of the acoustic cues in the relationship 
between the left and right sides of the lens. We found that the hierarchy-based 
acoustic differences exhibited by speakers partially mediated the relationship 
between speakers’ actual rank and perceivers’ inferences of speakers’ rank. 
Some final thoughts 
One of the most intriguing aspects of utilizing Brunswik’s Lens Model has been 
how naturally it underscores the importance of considering distal and proximal cues. 
In our work, the distal cues are the acoustic cues as they are originating from the 
speakers. The proximal cues are the auditory perceptions of the acoustic cues. The 
“…objectively measured distal cues are not necessarily equivalent to the proximal 
cues they produce in the observer. While the proximal cues are based on (or mimic) 
distal characteristics, the latter may be modified or distorted by (1) the transmission 
channel (e.g., distance, noise) and (2) the structural characteristics of the perceptual 
organ and the transduction and coding process” (Scherer, 2003, p. 230). 
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Consequently, the associations between individual distal and proximal cues do not 
always yield high ecological validity. Importantly, however, the beauty of our 
perceptual field is that “…the low ecological validity of single cue variables…may be 
compensated for…by the use of multiple systems of mutually substitutable, or 
“vicarious”, cues” (Brunswik, 1966, in Wolf, 2005, p. 488). Hence, individual cues that 
yield low ecological validity can contribute just as importantly to the overall 
achievement (defined as functional validity) as those that yield high ecological 
validity.  
In our Lens Model, we found that speakers used pitch variability to 
communicate rank but perceivers did not use it to infer rank. Perceivers used 
loudness to infer rank but speakers did not use it to convey rank. Thus, the distal cue 
change in pitch variability may have produced the proximal cue change in loudness. 
In other words, this inconsistency in the distal and proximal cues played a part in 
achieving functional validity. According to Brunswik (1952) without such 
inconsistencies in the distal and proximal cues, functional achievement may have 
failed.  
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University of Lausanne, Switzerland 
 
Contact: Julian.Marewski@unil.ch 
 
Dear colleagues,    
 
We like to draw your attention to a special issue on “Modeling and Aiding Intuition in 
Organizational Decision Making” (Marewski & Hoffrage, 2015) that recently appeared 
in the Journal of Applied Research in Memory and Cognition (JARMAC; 
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/journal/22113681), and we solicit 
commentaries on the articles and opinion pieces published in this issue.  
In this special issue, a total of 17 articles pull together diverse approaches to 
intuition, including naturalistic-decision-making, heuristics-and-biases, dual-
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processes, ACT-R, CLARION, Brunswikian approaches, and Quantum-Probability-
Theory. They use various methods (computational models, experimental and 
observational work, laboratory and naturalistic research), they cover various domains 
(consulting, investment, law, police, and morality), and they relate intuition to implicit 
cognition, emotions, scope insensitivity, expertise, and representative experimental 
design. Moreover, in our introductory article, we relate intuition research to historical, 
societal, and philosophical poles such as Enlightenment-Romanticism, reason-
emotion, objectivity-subjectivity, inferences-qualia, Taylorism-universal scholarship, 
dichotomies-dialectics, and science-art.  
The contributors to this special issue include several founders of influential 
research programs on intuition, four former presidents of the Society of Judgment 
and Decision Making (including the first two), a contemporary of towering 
Psychologist Egon Brunswik, and various former or current editors of general and 
specialized psychology journals (e.g., Psychological Review, Judgment and Decision 
Making, Decision).  
In addition to soliciting the usual type of scientific commentaries (e.g., 
extensions, critique, praise), we would, first and foremost, like to encourage 
commentaries that make and leave the reader curious, and in doing so, help her to 
create and shed light on the mystery of what is commonly called “intuition.”  
The articles, including our introductory article with its somehow unusual style 
and perspective and with its overview of the entire issue (Hoffrage & Marewski, 
2015a; see also 2015b), are open access and can be downloaded here: 
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/journal/22113681/4/3.  
 
I. Introduction: 
1. Ulrich Hoffrage & Julian N. Marewski 
 Unveiling the Lady in Black: Modeling and aiding intuition.   
  
II. Experience, Expertise, and Environments: 
2.  Gary Klein 
 A naturalistic decision making perspective on studying intuitive decision 
making  
3.  James Shanteau 
 Why task domains (still) matter for understanding expertise 
4. Kenneth R. Hammond 
 Causality vs generality: Judgment and decision making struggles to become 
a scientific discipline 
  
III. Formal Models and Cognitive Architectures: 
5. Robert Thomson, Christian Lebiere, John R. Anderson, & James Staszewski 
 A general instance-based learning framework for studying intuitive decision-
making in a cognitive architecture 
6. Ron Sun 
 Interpreting psychological notions: A dual-process computational theory 
7. Ion Juvina, Christian Lebiere, & Cleotilde Gonzalez 
 Modeling trust dynamics in strategic interaction  
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IV. Prescription, Aiding, and Rationality: 
8. Rex V. Brown 
 Decision science as a by-product of decision-aiding: A practitioner's 
perspective 
9. Robin Hogarth & Emre Soyer 
 Providing information for decision making: Contrasting description and 
simulation 
10. Lee C. White, Emmanuel M. Pothos, & Jerome R. Busemeyer 
 Insights from quantum cognitive models for organizational decision making  
  
V. Sentencing, Valuation, and Moral Judgments: 
11. Mandeep K. Dhami, Ian Belton, & Jane Goodman-Delahunty 
 Quasirational models of sentencing  
12. Stephan Dickert, Daniel Västfjäll, Janet Kleber, & Paul Slovic 
 Scope insensitivity: The limits of intuitive valuation of human lives in public 
policy  
13. Martina Raue, Bernhard Streicher, Eva Lermer, & Dieter Frey 
 How far does it feel? Construal level and decisions under risk  
14. Jonathan Baron, Sydney Scott, Katrina Fincher, & S. Emlen Metz 
 Why does the Cognitive Reflection Test (sometimes) predict utilitarian moral 
judgment (and other things)? 
  
VI. Intuition in the Wild: 
15. Sylviane Chassot, Christian A. Klöckner, & Rolf Wüstenhagen 
 Can implicit cognition predict the behavior of professional energy investors? 
An explorative application of the Implicit Association Test (IAT) 
16. Shanique G. Brown & Catherine S. Daus 
 The influence of police officers’ decision-making style and anger control on 
responses to work scenarios 
17. Thorsten Pachur & Melanie Spaar 
 Domain-specific preferences for intuition and deliberation in decision making  
 
If you are interested in writing a commentary on one or several of these articles, 
please send us (Julian.marewski@unil.ch, Ulrich.Hoffrage@unil.ch, with cc to the 
journal’s editor-in-chief Ron Fisher, fisherr@fiu.edu), before January 10th, 2016, a 
short summary of your proposal (about 1/4 page). We will then decide, before 
January 15th, whether (or not) we invite you to submit a full commentary. Invited 
commentaries should be submitted by February 29th. If you anticipate that you will 
need more time to write your commentary than the 6 weeks we can grant you, we 
kindly ask you to submit us your ¼ page commentary proposal any time between 
today and January 10th. If your commentary proposal convinces us on the spot, we 
will immediately invite you to submit a full commentary, which will give you more time 
until the submission deadline.  
 
The final version should ultimately fit two journal pages (which amounts to a 
maximum of approx. 1,800 words, including references), but we are able to offer 
more space if we can be convinced that readers will likely feel their time to be well-
spent.  
 
Julian Marewski & Ulrich Hoffrage  
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News from the Past Year 
 __________________________ 
 
 
Jeryl L. Mumpower 
Texas A&M University, USA 
 
Contact: jmumpower@tamu.edu 
 
I just completed my third year as Division Director for Social and Economic 
Sciences at the U.S. National Science Foundation. As I indicated last year, it was a 
most interesting and challenging experience and I believe I was able to make a 
contribution to our sciences, but it certainly had an adverse effect on my ability to get 
research done. I am now back at my home institution, Texas A&M University and 
hope to rejuvenate my research program a bit. 
I did publish three papers this year, but none of these had a distinctly 
Brunswikian theme. My colleagues Xinsheng Liu and Arnie Vedlitz published a paper 
in the Journal of Risk Research on psychometric and socio-demographic predictors 
of the perceived risk of climate change. And I published two papers with Mike Lindell 
and his graduate students relating to risk perception and protective action decision 
making in water contamination emergencies. (Mike and I were both graduate 
students at the same time with Ken Hammond in Boulder, long, long ago.) 
On a more Brunswikian note, Tom Stewart, Jim Holzworth and I continue 
working, albeit at a snail’s pace, on our next paper stemming from our research 
program investigating how people make selection and detection decisions (e.g., how 
they to decide whether to hire someone or whether a patient has a disease) in the 
face of uncertainty and different feedback conditions.  
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Cross-Classified Structural Equation Models  
for the Analysis of Lens Model Data 
___________________________________________ 
 
 
Steffen Nestler 
 University of Münster, Germany 
 
Mitja D. Back 
University of Münster, Germany 
 
Contact: steffen.nestler@wwu.de 
 
An important asset of Brunswikian research is that human behavior is 
analyzed both by an idiographic and a nomothetic approach. Whereas the 
idiographic approach focuses on dynamics within the single individual (e.g., how 
accurate a specific perceiver is, how much this perceiver uses a given cue), the 
nomothetic approach tries to find general laws across persons (e.g., how accurate 
perceivers are in general, how much a given cue is generally used). To consider both 
approaches in data analyses, lens model researchers typically take a two-step 
approach: First, a respective parameter, such as agreement or the utilization of a 
cue, is computed for each single judge. Second, these single-judge parameters are 
then used (a) to provide idiographic statistical information (e.g., the variance of the 
single-judge parameters), (b) nomothetic statistical information (e.g., the average of 
the single-judge parameters), or (c) information concerning a specific research 
question (e.g., effects of perceiver personality on accuracy and individual cue usage) 
by employing a more complex statistical approach (e.g., regression models, 
univariate and multivariate ANOVAs, path models, etc.).  
The two-step approach however is statistically problematic as a single-judge 
parameter (e.g., the agreement coefficient of judge i) is always an estimate of the 
true single-judge parameter (e.g., the true agreement coefficient of judge i). It thus 
contains both the true population parameter and error. When the second-step 
approach fails to take into account this error, the standard errors of the second-step 
analysis approach, for example, are probably not trustworthy. To overcome these 
problems, we suggest using cross-classified structural equation models instead (CC-
SEM; see Nestler & Back, in press).  
In a CC-SEM, the single judge’s data is simultaneously analyzed. This allows 
a researcher (1) to obtain statistically sound measures on the idiographic level of 
analysis (e.g., individual differences between perceivers in agreement or cue 
utilization) as well as the nomothetic level (e.g., the mean agreement or the mean 
cue utilization). The model can be used (2) to examine variables that may explain 
variations in agreement or cue usage. Also, a researcher can test (3) whether 
observable cues mediate the agreement of judgments or (4) whether the strength of 
valid cue usage depends on certain characteristics of the judges. Finally, the model 
allows a researcher (5) to explicitly model measurement error when there is more 
than one indicator for the criterion or the judgment. For a straightforward application 
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of these kinds of analyses we provide R and Mplus syntax files that can be easily 
adjusted for one’s own research questions and data (see https://osf.io/zyx4w/). 
In summary, CC-SEMs unify the idiographic and nomothetic levels in the 
analysis of lens model data. Furthermore, a number of additional and interesting 
research questions can be answered allowing us to more deeply delve into the 
fascinating Brunswikian world.  
Reference: 
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Error Parsing:  
Implementing Social Judgment Theory in the Units of Judgment 
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University of Washington, USA 
 
Contact: daniel.oppenheimer@anderson.ucla.edu 
 
For over 50 years Social Judgment Theory (SJT) has proven to be a 
tremendously useful tool for analyzing judgment and helping judges improve their 
performance. SJT is primarily concerned with four key pieces of information: 1) the 
predictability of the environment (i.e., how well environmental cues correlate with the 
outcomes a judge is trying predict), 2) the knowledge of the judge (i.e., how 
accurately a judge weights the environmental cues in making a prediction), 3) the 
“control” of the judge (i.e., how consistently a judge weights the environmental cues 
in making a prediction), and 4) the overall achievement of the judge (i.e., how well 
the judge’s predictions correlate with the outcomes the judge is trying to predict). By 
providing judges with feedback on these four things, decision scientists have been 
able to help people make better estimates. 
Historically, these four constructs were measured using correlational methods. 
This makes a great deal of sense; correlation is the most natural way of measuring 
the relationship between two continuous variables (such as examining the extent to 
which an environmental cue predicts an outcome). Moreover, many of the studies 
using SJT have used abstract scales (such as Likert Scales) which do not cleanly 
map onto real world, measurable units. 
However, often judgments are not made on abstract scales – such as when 
one is trying to estimate the price of a car, the number of calories in a snack, or the 
number of people who will be displaced by a hurricane. In such cases, feedback in 
the form of correlation coefficients may be hard to interpret and apply. Feedback in 
absolute units (e.g., dollars) may be more useful. Moreover, there are times when 
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identical correlation coefficients can represent drastically different amounts of 
absolute error. For example, {1,2,3,4} correlates perfectly with both {1,2,3,4} and 
{7,8,9,10} but the absolute magnitude of difference in the latter is much greater than 
in the former.   
To address these issues, we introduce Error Parsing, a method of SJT that 
makes use of absolute magnitude rather than correlations. By taking insights from the 
Bootstrapping literature and combining them with the logic of SJT, Error Parsing 
provides outputs in the units of judgment. Especially for people who don’t have much 
statistical training, correlation coefficients may be difficult to make sense of and 
incorporate into subsequent predictions. Moreover, unlike correlation, which can 
obscure the magnitude of difference, in Error Parsing absolute magnitudes are 
straightforward and obvious. (For another way of removing biases due to 
correlations, see Stewart & Lusk, 1994.)   
Of course, more traditional forms of SJT are still better than Error Parsing 
under many circumstances. For example, correlation (and thus SJT) is better for 
reducing deviation from ordinal rankings – a situation where Error Parsing requires a 
number of (unlikely to be true) assumptions to be valid. Error Parsing is much more 
suited for reducing absolute differences in error. For interested scholars, our paper 
“Error Parsing: An alternative method of implementing social judgment theory” in the 
September issue of the Journal of Decision Making, includes a complete description 
of the Error Parsing methodology, a comparison of the outputs of SJT and Error 
Parsing on real data sets, and an analysis of when Error Parsing is more (or less) 
effective than more traditional SJT approaches.  
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My paper “the uses and abuses of the coherence – correspondence 
distinction” was recently published in Frontiers in Psychology. As its title suggests, 
the article traces the historical development of Hammond’s suggested distinction and 
discusses its role in debates over human rationality. Here I summarize its main 
message. 
Kenneth Hammond’s distinction between coherence and correspondence has 
been used to frame important debates in psychological research. Consider, in 
particular, that in recent decades research on judgment and decision-making has 
witnessed the development of several different approaches to human rationality, 
which differ in terms of the importance they attribute to traditional normative models 
and the adaptiveness of behaviour in the assessment of performance (e.g., Chater & 
Oaksford, 2000; Gigerenzer et al., 1999; Kahneman & Tversky, 1972). Whilst these 
different projects have arguably remained somewhat disconnected, Hammond (1990, 
1996, 2007) has attempted to remedy this balkanization. To promote cross-
fertilization between different lines of research, he first tried to outline a framework 
that could allow him to identify different strategies available to us in the study of 
human judgment. Hammond’s distinction between coherence and correspondence 
criteria of rationality was central to his project and hence offered as a powerful tool in 
the study of judgment and decision-making. The latter strategy is called 
correspondence “because it evaluates the correspondence between the judgment 
and the empirical fact that is the object of the judgment” (Hammond, 2007, p. 16). 
Coherence, on the other hand, relates to the fit between people’s judgments. 
Specifically, Hammond (2007, p. 16) defines coherence as “the consistency of the 
elements of the person’s judgment.” According to him, “it is easy to see the difference 
between a judgment that is directed toward coherence – make it all fit together – and 
one that is directed toward the correspondence between a judgment and a fact” 
(Hammond, 2007, p. 19). 
Armed with this distinction, Hammond tried to make sense of different lines of 
research in the study of human judgment. On one extreme, Brunswik’s (1956) 
research offered a prominent illustration of work on correspondence. His research 
focused entirely on empirical accuracy, which comes down to the correspondence 
between a judgment and an object. On the other extreme, Hammond argued that 
research in the heuristics and biases tradition provided a paradigmatic example of 
research on coherence (Gilovich et al., 2002). Whilst the heuristics and biases project 
was motivated by a desire to offer accurate descriptions of human judgment and 
decision-making and give insight into underlying mechanisms and processes, its 
researchers measured behaviour against a set of normative principles. For example, 
subjects are said to violate coherence when they commit the conjunction fallacy, 
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ranking the conjunctive event A and B as higher in probability than one of its 
component events (see, e.g., Tversky & Kahneman, 1983). Hammond concluded 
that this distinction proved useful in categorizing research in the field. Yet, he was 
aware that, while correspondence refers here to empirical accuracy, a criterion with 
which we are all familiar, providing a specific characterization of coherence would be 
a daunting task. 
Notably, Hammond’s suggested distinction has been widely used in the field 
and it has been widely recognized as a useful conceptual tool in the study of 
judgment and decision-making (Adam & Reyna, 2005; Baron, 2012; Lee & Zhang, 
2012; Mandel, 2005; Newell, 2005; Wallin, 2013). It was also celebrated in 2009 in a 
special issue of the journal Judgment and Decision Making. Yet, as my paper seeks 
to show, the relevant notions of coherence and correspondence have been 
progressively considered to be too narrow and have undergone non-trivial conceptual 
changes since their original introduction.  
I try to show, first, that the proliferation of different conceptualizations of 
coherence and correspondence has created confusion in the literature and that 
appealing to such notions has not helped to elucidate current discussions over the 
nature of rational judgment and decision-making. Nevertheless, I also argue for a 
reframing of the debate. In fact, what seems to underlie several contemporary 
appeals to the notions of coherence and correspondence is best explained in terms 
of a contrast between what I call rule-based and goal-based rationality. Whilst these 
categories do need further refinement, they do seem to be useful for organizing and 
understanding research on rational judgment and decision-making.  
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It is an honor to have been invited to contribute to the Brunswik Society 
newsletter in relation to our recent paper "Quantifying biopsychosocial aspects in 
everyday contexts: An integrative methodological approach from the behavioral 
sciences" (Portell, Anguera, Hernández-Mendo, & Jonsson, 2015). The article 
reviews the shared properties and requirements of different methods and techniques 
for quantifying biopsychosocial aspects in everyday contexts and proposes a general 
framework for integrating them.  
In our paper, we address methods for studying biopsychosocial aspects in 
natural settings in real time and on repeated occasions. According to the majority of 
these methods, researchers must necessarily sample observations from 
environmental contexts as well as from populations of participants if they are to 
effectively capture psychosocial phenomena. Readers of the Brunswik Society 
Newsletter will undoubtedly know that these methods follow the logic of Brunswik’s 
concept of representative design, but we firmly believe that it is necessary to explicitly 
make this connection in other publications.  
Hammond (1998a) summarizes the complicated times during which Brunswik 
had to justify, apply, and defend the representative design approach, which called 
into question the methodological "ideology" of the time. Difficulties related to 
technological limitations are progressively being overcome, and the explosion of 
information and communication technologies has facilitated the application of the 
representative design approach and led to methodological innovations seeking to 
quantify biopsychosocial aspects in everyday contexts. We believe that the viability 
and increasing visibility of these methods constitute an opportunity to pay tribute to 
Brunswik’s contributions, which was precisely our intention when writing our paper. 
We hoped to contribute to reinforcing the link between the representative design 
approach and later innovations, such as the experience sampling method and similar 
methods for studying psychological phenomena in natural settings. Although not all 
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texts that trace the historical roots of these modern-day methods mention Brunswik's 
contributions, fortunately many do. We would like to draw particular attention to 
Hogarth’s (2005) work and to take this opportunity to thank him for guiding us in our 
own approach to Brunswik’s methodology.  
Our approach to daily life research methods emphasizes three key points in 
relation to studies designed to provide evidence for evaluating complex interventions, 
and in particular, implementation fidelity (Portell, Anguera, Chacón-Moscoso, & 
Sanduvete, 2015). The first point is the relatively little value still attached to the efforts 
invested in studies involving the direct observation of behavior in natural, everyday 
settings. In our paper, we describe a number of remarkable methodological 
innovations that have emerged despite the difficulties, and in addition we propose a 
series of classification criteria for research methods for studying everyday life, 
including observational methodology (Anguera, 1979). The second point is related to 
the importance of tools for studying behavior as patterns that occur over time. 
Intensive recording of events and behaviors, combined with appropriate statistical 
methods, has made it possible to uncover time patterns “hidden” within the data 
(Magnusson, 1996). The third point we stress is the importance of avoiding 
methodological dogmatism and of choosing the most appropriate method for each 
case. Although the research methods and techniques we review in our paper offer 
many benefits for the study of everyday life, we strongly advocate the complementary 
use of different designs and approaches to enhance the validity of the research. 
However, even though a variety of methods can provide robust evidence for 
particular interventions or psychological principles, this evidence is likely to be 
ignored as long as randomized clinical trials remain the gold standard for evaluating 
psychological interventions (e.g., Carey & Stiles, 2015).  
Finally, we would like to take this opportunity to mention something that got 
lost during the "pilgrimage" of our paper through different journals. In the published 
version, we do not mention the fact that Brunswik used the term "ecological validity" 
with a different meaning from that commonly understood today. We nonetheless 
share the concern about the threat that polysemy poses to the development of 
psychology as a cumulative science. The implications of this conceptual confusion 
have been discussed by Hammond (1998b) and by Dhami, Hertwig and Hoffrage 
(2004), cited in our paper.  
Despite the above challenges, we are hopeful that the different efforts to 
enhance the connection between Egon Brunswik’s methodological innovations and 
research methods being using to study everyday life in the 21st century will contribute 
to the development of a truly cumulative psychological science.  
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History and Philosophy of Science (HOPOS) has recently become a research 
program of its own. A precursor and a sideline of this research is the investigation of 
the history of Logical Empiricism in all of its ramifications. It is widely known that 
Egon Brunswik was associated with Logical Empiricism, but he was not a “Logical 
Empiricist” in a narrow sense. Moreover, he was influenced by his Viennese teacher, 
Karl Bühler, who represented a different approach. 
Although Bühler was Brunswik’s main influence on the development of his 
psychological research program, another Austrian thinker is also important. In a 
recent paper (Radler, 2015), I showed how Alexius Meinong’s notion of a forum of 
perception triggered the idea that perception must be conceptualized as a process, 
which is necessarily embedded in an environment. In explaining perception, external 
constituents must be included. 
As already noted in the literature (e.g., Wieser, 2014), Fritz Heider, Meinong’s 
last PhD student, provided Brunswik with an important inspiration for his “lens 
model”. Perception must be regarded as a mediated process. Thus, a direct line of 
intellectual inheritance can be drawn from Meinong’s “forum” (Meinong, 1906) and 
Heider’s “medium” (Heider, 1920; 1927/1959) to Brunswik’s “lens” (Brunswik, 1934). 
Whereas Heider is ambivalent because the “medium” is necessary but also 
influences and therefore disturbs the perception of the object, Brunswik avoided this 
tension. Brunswik’s avoidance does not indicate that he is a Meinongian. On the 
contrary, he is skeptical of the metaphysical stance of Meinong (Brunswik, 1934, p. 3, 
note 1). Brunswik had no interest in establishing a new philosophical theory of 
everything, but had rather more modest inclinations to establish a “scientific” 
psychology. The term “scientific” means to be in accord with the demands of 
“physicalism” to the effect that every scientific term must be translatable into a 
“physical” term. This holds also for psychology (Neurath, 1933/1992). Clearly, 
Brunswik here is in accord with Logical Empiricism. Brunswik took the position of Otto 
Neurath, who persuaded his peers to agree with him. Brunswik’s “psychology in 
terms of objects” is mainly a physicalistic research program (Brunswik, 1934, p. 214, 
note 1; Brunswik, 1937).  
   
  
41  (BACK: Table of Contents) 
Another line of research is followed in Radler (2013). The Norwegian 
philosopher Arne Naess was – in his early years – strictly in agreement with Otto 
Neurath. In his magnum opus (Naess, 1953), Naess coined the idea of a depth of 
intention to denote the degree of precision of a formulation. The idea of a depth of 
intention is important for two reasons. First, in the protocol-sentence debate, Neurath 
suggested using imprecise formulations on which most people in a debate can agree 
(congestions, Ballungen). A too-precise formulation will not help to foster scientific 
cooperation, and science is, for Neurath, a cooperative endeavor. Therefore, a term’s 
low depth of intention is desirable. Second, later in the 1970s, Naess formulated the 
“deep ecology” approach, that is, an attempt to provide solutions to the 
environmental problems of our planet. “Deep ecology” cannot be understood without 
taking Naess’s empirical semantics into consideration (Howe, 2011). 
Deep ecology must be understood, as I have showed, as a platform of 
discussion and cooperation for all of those who are engaged with environmental 
issues. One can see how this echoes Neurath’s idea of a unified science. 
Additionally, Naess clearly had Brunswik’s notion of “Intentionstiefe” (depth of 
intention, Brunswik, 1934, p. 102) in mind when he worked on his empirical 
semantics. In general, one can find Brunswikian traces in all of Naess’s writings.  
In sum, these studies show that Brunswik’s research into perception left traces 
where nobody would expect them – in Naess’s empirical semantics and even in his 
deep ecology. My research can be read as a proposal to consider J. J. Gibson’s 
ecological psychology anew. Historically, theories of perception from Meinong, 
Heider, Bühler and Brunswik are mediated and indirect but nevertheless externalistic. 
On this topic, further research is welcome.  
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Different knowledge-systems  
A recent doctoral thesis (Skoog, 2015) presented at Lund University studied 
indications for drug treatment. This population study comprised 77,978 elderly 
patients’ charts. On average only 45.1% of the patients had correct diagnoses, i.e., 
indications for drug treatment. Of the patients who used anti-psychotic drugs only 
18% (467 of 2,601) had indications for these drugs. The author comments on these 
findings as follows: “On average, less than half of the described drugs had 
indications for treatment. … It is alarming that so few of the prescribed drugs had 
correct indications” (ibid, Paper IV, p. 8.). Some retroactive first person evaluation of 
psychiatrists’ chart notes have revealed a shocking lack of idiographic, patient-
specific information in combination with drug descriptions (Sjödahl, 2004, 2012). This 
unmotivated use of drugs, in particular antipsychotic drugs is a threat to the patients’ 
quality of life and their capacity for recovery and functioning (Sjödahl & Kaufmann, 
2008). 
 
Asymmetric decision situations 
How to handle asymmetric decision situations, where one party holds on to 
inside information not accessible to the other party, has been studied by the 
economists Akerlöf, Spence and Stiglitz (Harford, 2006). We may learn from them 
how to cope with asymmetric decision problems like diagnostic situations where both 
parties, doctor and patient, due to their different knowledge systems (focal versus 
tacit, idiographic versus nomothetical) have their own inside information, not fully 
accessible to the other part. Based on the three economists’ suggestions we propose 
the following three guidelines to overcome the asymmetry between the diagnosing 
psychiatrist and his/her patient in order to improve the validity of psychiatric 
diagnostics: 1) Patient and psychiatrist should agree about common goals like relief 
of symptoms, protection of the patient’s mental assets and a planned follow-up of the 
patient’s quality of life; 2) The person with inside information should become skilled in 
communicating it to the other person in a way that the latter trusts; 3) The person 
without the partner’s inside information should become skilled in uncovering it in a 
trustworthy way. These three fundamental principles for solving asymmetric decision 
situations raise a question: Are psychiatrists and their patients skilled in mutually 
communicating and uncovering their respective inside information in a diagnostic 
decision situation? Some indirect information, relevant for our question, can be found 
within nursing research studying interpersonal relations between psychiatric ward 
personnel and their patients (Reed & Fitzgerald, 2005; Ross & Goldner, 2009). 
According to these reports it seems likely that neither ward personnel nor patients are 
trained for dealing with mutually asymmetric decision situations. Here the validity of 
patients’ chart notes as well of psychiatric diagnoses is at risk.  
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Coherence or correspondence criteria 
  According to Tape (2009): “The field of medicine historically focused on 
coherence arguments and only recently has attention been focused on 
correspondence approaches…. Even today coherence arguments carry enormous 
weight in justifying medical therapies…. Practicing physicians often use coherence 
arguments to explain their judgments” (pp. 134-135). 
A wicked way of solving a mutual, asymmetric decision situation by group- 
coherence consists of one part being forced to completely assimilate the other part’s 
inside information at expense of giving up his/her own inside information. This 
actually happened in a Swedish psychiatric hospital (Day, 2012; Porter, 2015). The 
patient, who called himself Thomas Quick, completely assimilated the therapists’ 
ideas about repressed memories. “During all therapy sessions and police 
reconstructions Quick was heavily drugged on a cocktail of benzodiazepines. Medical 
records show that he was being giving tablets every couple of hours- often up to 20 
mg of diazepam” (ibid). Altogether Quick confessed to more than 30 murders and 
was declared guilty of 8. Today all these verdicts are reversed. The turning point 
came with the publication of a book based on interviews with Quick, where he was 
given the opportunity to reveal his own inside information, verified by correspondence 
criteria (Råstam, 2012). In the preface to this book Leif G. W. Persson, Professor of 
Criminology, writes: “This is a book which tells us what happened when Swedish 
police, prosecutors, and lawyers, with willing support from some doctors, 
psychologists and a so-called memory expert, crowned a mentally ill mythomaniac as 
the worst serial killer in the history of crime” (ibid, p. 13) (Author’s translation). The 
extensive governmental report (SOU, 2015, p. 52) sums up: “Within this group there 
seems to have developed group thinking and an ambition to reach coherence” (ibid, 
p. 16). (Author’s translation) 
The need for cooperation between clinician and patient in psychiatric 
diagnosis has been emphasized in an earlier contribution to the Brunswik Society 
Newsletter as follows: “That diagnostic inference, or labeling, always should be made 
within the context of environmental and personal factors implies that clinicians and 
patients must find ways to cooperate with the purpose of improving the clinician’s 
feedback situation and at the same time establish a trustful, lasting alliance, making 
alternative treatments, beside drug prescriptions, possible” (Sjödahl & Kaufmann, 
2009).  
The three premises mentioned above for successful solutions of asymmetric 
decision situations probably apply to all levels of social organization and when 
violated the outcome could be lamentable as the following poem illustrates: 
 
PLAYING MARBLES 
We played marbles on the square one day, a small schoolboy and me. I had 
about 50 and he had 5. 
We played and he lost. 
He sniffled and threw me a look when I whistled in a superior manner and 
walked away. 
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But I regretted it when I got to our street-door and felt I’d done something bad. 
I hurried back but nowhere could anyone tell me where the schoolboy could be 
found. 
I felt ashamed, and still feel so, when I see schoolboys playing marbles. 
And I’d give anything, I don’t know how much, to see that schoolboy happy 
again. 
But now he’s surely a big, stout man, slaving away – I don’t know where. 
And if I did know – it wouldn’t help – you can never right your wrongs. 
You can never give marbles back and console boys who have frozen into 
men.  
 (Selander, 1926). (Author’s translation).  
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This contribution for the Brunswik Society Newsletter is an adapted version of 
the conference paper of Steffens, J., Steele, D. and Guastavino, C. (2015). New 
Insights into Soundscape Evaluations Using the Experience Sampling Method. 
Proceedings of Euronoise 2015, Maastricht, Netherlands. 
Listening to our acoustic environment takes time. One way a sound “persists” 
through time is when it is perceived and remembered by listeners. Any expressed 
evaluation of an acoustic environment necessarily makes use of retrospection, 
whether we are still in the environment or remembering one from our childhood. The 
influence of cognitive processes, especially memory representations of a temporal 
experience, may lead to a weighting of certain episodes in the course of an overall 
retrospective evaluation. 
Previous research in the field of decision-making psychology has shown that 
momentary (i.e., “in-the-moment”) judgments of time-varying experiences do not 
always match retrospective judgments (e.g., “Peak-end rule” by Kahneman, 
Fredrickson, Schreiber, & Redelmeier, 1993). Laboratory studies by Västfjäll (2004) 
and Steffens and Guastavino (2015) suggest that retrospective judgments of 
environmental sounds are also affected by cognitive biases such as the recency or 
the trend effect. Furthermore, mood is shown to have an overall effect on sound 
evaluations and on a participant’s preference for sound (e.g., Västfjäll, 2002). 
Methodological issues, however, raise the need to extend the investigations to longer 
and more eventful sound periods, to remove the laboratory and investigator from the 
context, and to also take into account situational variables. One method that allows 
the measurement of peoples' reactions in everyday situations and associated time 
scales is the so-called Experience Sampling Method (ESM). ESM refers to a method 
of data collection in which people periodically make momentary judgments over the 
course of the day while going about their everyday activities (Csikszentmihalyi, 
Larsson, & Prescott, 1977). The ESM is in line with Brunswik's (1947) concept of a 
representative design of experiments that allow the sampling of stimuli from the 
person's natural environment which are representative of the population of stimuli to 
which the person has adapted. Brunswik further highlighted the importance of 
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understanding how various psychological factors function and interact in different 
real-life situations.  
Thus, the aim of our study was to extend the validity of existing findings to 
soundscape. According to a recent ISO definition (2014), soundscape is “the acoustic 
environment as perceived or experienced and/or understood by a person or people, 
in context”. We hypothesized that daily retrospective judgments of soundscape 
pleasantness are governed by the average of the momentary judgments obtained 
over the course of the day, the linear trend, the positive and negative peaks 
(maximum and minimum values), and the end (last measuring point). We finally 
assumed an influence of the person's mood while making the retrospective judgment. 
32 participants, 17 women and 15 men with a mean age of 28.8 years 
(SD = 5.6), participated in the study. They were recruited via mailing lists for current 
students, postdocs, faculty and staff of McGill and via Craigslist. 80.8% of the 
participants were students; the rest (19.1%) had a job outside the university. 
Participants were recruited on the basis of having an Android smartphone that they 
regularly carried with them. Those who did not have an Android phone but who 
wished to take the study were provided with an alternate device. 
In total, three different questionnaires were presented in this study. One 
questionnaire was designed to report momentary judgments of the soundscape over 
the course of the day and occurred at 10 near-random times per day. Amongst 
others, this “momentary form” contained the question on soundscape pleasantness 
(“How do you rate the pleasantness of the soundscape?”). This question had to be 
answered on a 7-step Likert scale ranging from unpleasant (1) to pleasant (7). The 
second form used in the study was the “daily summary”. In this questionnaire, 
participants were requested to perform retrospective judgments of the whole day 
(e.g., “How do you rate the pleasantness of the soundscape(s) over the whole day?”) 
using the same seven-step Likert scales as for the momentary judgments. 
Participants were also asked to report on their current mood (from bad (1) to good 
(7)). The third and last form employed was the “weekly summary” which provided 
overall retrospective judgments of soundscape pleasantness over the course of the 
whole 7-day period. However, within this contribution, only the relationship between 
momentary and daily retrospective judgments will be presented.  
Since the aim of the study was to investigate which features of the momentary 
judgments contribute to the retrospective judgments of a day, a linear mixed model 
was calculated. In this calculation, the average, the maximum (“Peak (max)”) and the 
minimum value (“Peak (min)”) occurring over the course of a day as well as the last 
measuring point (“End”) of the momentary judgments were considered potential 
independent variables of the daily summaries. Additionally, the linear trend over the 
course of the day was computed. It is the standardized regression coefficient of a 
linear regression analysis with the independent variable time. Finally, the 
retrospective pleasantness judgment obtained in the daily summary was considered 
the dependent variable. 
The calculation of the linear mixed model (covariance matrix: compound 
symmetry) revealed four fixed effects predicting the daily retrospective judgments: 
the average, the linear trend, the negative peak (Peak (min)), and the mood of the 
person while making the judgment. The regression statistics are reported in Table 1. 
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The results of our study confirm our assumption that retrospective judgments 
of soundscape pleasantness are not only governed by “cognitive averaging” 
processes but also by specifically unpleasant peak moments. 
 
Table 1 
Mixed Models Analysis of the Relationship of Retrospective Judgments and Features 
of the Momentary Judgment - Estimates of Fixed Effects 
Variable Estimate Std. Error t Sig.-Level 
Intercept .66 .51 1.28 .20 
Average 1.00 .13 7.74 .00 
Trend .53 .16 3.25 .00 
Peak(min) -.18 .07 -2.50 .01 
Mood .32 .07 4.37 .00 
 
Moreover, the results provide further empirical evidence that judgment 
processes in auditory perception are influenced by a person's mood and anticipation 
how the soundscape experience might go on (derived from the linear trend). This is, 
to a large extent, in line with the literature mentioned above. However, neither a 
significant effect of the last measuring point (recency effect) nor of the positive peak 
was found. This can be explained by a theoretical overlap of the trend and the 
recency effect (e.g., Loewenstein & Prelec, 1993). It therefore can be assumed that 
the recency effect did not explain further variance beyond that already explained by 
the linear trend. We further did not observe an effect of the positive peak (in contrast 
to a significant effect of the negative peak), which might be due to a negativity bias. 
This effect indicates that, based on predispositions and experience, negative events 
receive greater weight compared to equivalent positive events (Rozin & Royzman, 
2001). 
Two limitations associated with the method have to be addressed. Since no 
variables were experimentally varied within the study and relationships are only 
observed on a correlational basis, the ESM does not allow the researcher to draw 
definite conclusions about causal relationships. Furthermore, the ESM is time-
consuming, expensive, and demanding for both the participant and the researcher. 
However, the ESM proves to be a promising method to investigate the perception 
and evaluation of our acoustic environment in an ecologically valid context as 
inspired by Brunswik’s idea of a representative design.   
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In the study of human movement behavior, two critical features of Egon 
Brunswik’s ideas on representative design are functionality of the task and action 
fidelity (Brunswik, 1956). Functionality of the task refers to people being able to use 
information sources that are representative of those available in performance 
environments. Therefore, when researchers design experiments they should ensure 
that perceptual variables available in a performance environment are maintained in 
empirical work, so that behaviors examined during experimental tasks can be 
generalized to a performance environment. This functionality must also be combined 
with action fidelity, which refers to performers being able to organize the same types 
of actions that would be required in actual performance environments. This article 
summarizes a series of experiments, using a custom-built integrated video and ball 
projection technology (see Stone et al., 2014a), on performance of dynamic 
interceptive actions, to study visual anticipation and interceptive actions underpinned 
by the ideas of Brunswik’s (1956) representative learning design.  
In human movement experiments it has traditionally proven difficult to maintain 
both functionality and fidelity. In experiments investigating interceptive actions such 
as catching, using a "live" thrower to project an object means having the same 
individual available to perform the projection action throughout extended periods of 
experimental data collection, which can lead to a number of issues such as costs, 
time demands, or potential repetitive strain injury. A "live" performer can also 
introduce unintended variability into the projection action, potentially introducing a 
source of error across experimental conditions or participants. Some of these 
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limitations can be overcome by using traditional ball projection machines for relatively 
stable ball flight trajectories to be maintained over trials without incurring injury risk, 
costs or inordinate time demands on skilled individuals to “deliver” the ball to 
participants. Yet this type of ball projection technology means advanced perceptual 
information from a thrower’s actions is no longer available. Consequently, 
functionality is not provided in experiments, since participants are not exposed to the 
same perceptual information that would be available in a typical performance 
environment. Traditionally, some studies have used life-size images of a person 
projecting (e.g., throwing or striking) a ball with participants required to respond 
verbally or using pen and paper. Whilst this ensures that functionality of the task is 
achieved in a controlled and consistent manner, the inability of participants to use 
relevant behaviors, i.e., physically intercept the object, means that fidelity is not 
satisfied. 
In order to achieve task functionality and action fidelity we developed a novel 
methodological approach that maintains information-movement coupling when 
studying performance of dynamic interceptive actions, such as ball catching. The 
apparatus combines video and ball projection technology which enables video 
images (e.g., of an actor throwing a ball) to be synchronized with a ball being 
projected from a hole in the screen. In this experimental design, participants are 
presented with advanced perceptual information from images of an actor 
(functionality) and are then required to intercept (catch or hit) a projectile (fidelity). 
Using this apparatus a series of empirical investigations have been undertaken to 
test Brunswik’s ideas on representative design, examining the significance of 
functionality and fidelity when designing experimental task constraints. Our 
experimental program has employed this integrated projection technology to study 
the relations between affordances and emergent behaviors in one-handed catching 
tasks, recording kinematic data, visual gaze behaviors, and measures of postural 
control in skilled and less skilled individuals (see Panchuk et al., 2013; Stone et al., 
2014 a, b, c; Stone et al., 2015).  
 
 
Figure 1. Taken from Stone et al. (2014a). The custom-built ball projection device 
and set-up showing a) front and b) side views. 
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The combined video and ball projection technology first resulted in improved 
catching performance (i.e., people successfully caught more balls) and showed more 
functional kinematic movement patterns of the catching hand compared to video or 
ball projection only conditions (Stone et al., 2014b). Gaze behaviors also changed, 
with visual tracking of the ball occurring earlier and lasting longer during the 
integrated condition compared to ball projection only (Stone et al., 2014b). Postural 
coordination behaviors were also shown to be dependent on the representativeness 
of informational constraints designed into experiments, with changes in postural 
control strategies observed when advanced visual information or ball trajectories 
were manipulated (Stone et al., 2014c). For example, when functionality of the task 
was altered (e.g., removal of video information of a 'thrower'), postural adjustments of 
the lower limbs occurred later compared to when visual information was available. 
When action fidelity was manipulated (participants used micro-movements to 
simulate catching actions without a ball being projected), smaller displacements were 
observed in lower limb angles, resulting in upward projection of the center of mass 
compared to a downward projection when fidelity was maintained (balls were 
projected and physically intercepted). The results highlighted the importance of 
representative designs which allow information-movement coupling to be maintained 
during performance of interceptive actions. Movement behaviors are continuously 
organized and adapted using both advanced kinematic information of an individual's 
actions and ball flight characteristics.  
In conclusion, the series of experiments that we have conducted in this 
program of work are grounded in Brunswik’s (1956) ideas on representative design. 
Developing a novel apparatus that combines video and ball projection, we 
demonstrated that experimental designs which fail to accurately represent 
performance environments result in less accurate performance of a primary task, less 
efficient and effective visual search behaviors and hand kinematics, as well as 
different postural control strategies in comparison to conditions that more faithfully 
represent the informational constraints of a performance setting. Our findings 
illustrate the combined importance of both functionality of the task and action fidelity 
when designing representative experimental settings. Egon Brunswik’s ideas are still 
relevant today and continue to inform the design of experimental research and 
practice environments in human movement science, psychology, and sport pedagogy 
(Pinder et al., 2011).   
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We scientists have an astonishing tendency to run madly off in all directions. 
The result is a rich mix of scientific fecundity and chaos. The fecundity ensures that 
our production of diverse, scientific knowledge far outpaces the attention required to 
consume it all. Chaos ensues as our prospective audiences pick and choose the tiny 
fraction they can consume of our productions. As collegial competitions for scientific 
attention multiply, members of our prospective audience become ever more likely to 
attend to what is popular or interesting than to what is elegant or important. Too often 
style defeats substance; substantial ideas sink into obscurity while their stylish 
competitors bask in the scientific spotlight. 
I am thus heartened that the Brunswik Society does its best to keep the 
substantial ideas of Brunswik and his intellectual progeny alive. Safe to say these 
ideas are worth knowing. Sad to say they are known by too few. So it is worthwhile to 
seek new audiences. 
I first became aware of Brunswik's limited audience while completing my 1971 
dissertation on multi-cue probability learning, a venerable Brunswikian topic. My 
results showed that few people increased their judgment accuracy by learning cue-
criterion relations; instead, most people increased their accuracy by learning 
memorable examples or prototypes and generalizing from these to their nearest 
neighbors. I vainly convinced myself that the finding had useful implications for 
teaching people how to improve their judgments through clever selection of case 
histories. Alas, the implications never caught on and they remain, as far as I know, in 
an unmarked graveyard of unexplored possibilities. 
Still undaunted and freshly employed, I began to inculcate Brunswikian 
concepts into my captive audiences of social psychology students, repeating the 
inculcation for 40 years. Brunswik's Lens Model remained beautifully suited for 
organizing the vast literature on person perception, impression and social judgment, 
but I never found a social psychology textbook adopting the Lens Model for this 
purpose. Even now, the most popular textbooks in social psychology make few if any 
references to Brunswik, opting instead for mimetic, topical accounts of social 
psychology's mad run. 
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Yet opportunities for spreading Brunswik's ideas still emerge now and then, 
often from unlikely places. One of these can be found in a newish area of computer 
simulation called agent-based modeling. Agent-based modelers write computer 
programs simulating the actions and interactions of hypothetical people, called 
agents, represented as algorithms supposedly capturing real people's psychological 
processes or rules. The modelers then watch their agents interact, hoping to witness 
the emergence or transformation of group structure or dynamics, of cooperation, 
competition, and such. They then change the psychological rules and study the 
collective consequences of these changes. Examples of such agent-based modeling 
can be found in any issues of its best-known publication, the Journal of Artificial 
Societies and Social Simulation, JASSS. 
When agent-based modelers program their simulations, they must decide 
which psychological rules to include. Alas, they often choose unrealistic or 
uncommon rules easily programmed rather than rules documented by our research. 
This has created a problem for modelers facing criticisms from funders and policy 
makers that their simulations are based on false assumptions. 
What the world of agent-based modeling needs are some useful methods for 
assessing, in the real world, what psychological processes of making judgments and 
decisions the people they wish to simulate are using. I suggested three of these 
methods in a recent JASSS article (http://jasss.soc.surrey.ac.uk/18/1/14.html). 
Thanks to Brunswik, Ken Hammond and their many colleagues, one of the three is 
policy capturing; the other two, information seeking and social choice, are close 
cousins.  
I am sure additional, policy-capturing methods inspired by Brunswik, 
Hammond and others would also be useful for agent-based modelers seeking to 
simulate the real world. So if you have developed or used any new and improved 
variant of policy capturing in your work, I encourage you to consider submitting an 
article about it to JASSS. A new and eager audience awaits your contribution. 
Spread the word! 
Thorngate, W. (2015). Heads and hearts: Three methods for explicating judgment and decision 
processes. Journal of Artificial Societies and Social Simulation, 18(1), 14. 
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I am still at the University, but have reduced my time to about 1/3. I’m enjoying 
the free time. 
Currently I have been working with Nasia Safdar, MD, PhD, an infectious 
disease researcher, and her team at the University of Wisconsin. We are 
investigating differences between medical residents and nursing staff in how they use 
clinical cues to estimate the likelihood a patient has Clostridium difficile infection 
(which causes a serious diarrheal illness). We asked physician and nursing staff at a 
large teaching hospital in Wisconsin, USA, to judge the likelihood of C. difficile and 
whether tests for the organism should be run. In keeping with previous interviews, a 
one-sided lens model with 5 cues showed significant differences between the two 
groups, with nurses weighting stool odor highest and physicians, the white blood 
count (with minimal weigh given stool odor). We are investigating further the reason 
for these differences and their impact on clinical management. In addition, we are 
building a model to study the policies of ancillary staff as well. 
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